The whitelist approach also applies to Android-style set-top boxes. All such devices are now illegal by default, pending state certification authorizing their use.<\/p>\n
Building\/Blocking Communications Infrastructure<\/h2>\n
Ensuring that only authorized platforms and devices are accessible in Brazil falls to telecoms regulator Anatel.<\/p>\n
In an interview with\u00a0Tele.Sintese<\/a>, outgoing Anatel board member Artur Coimbra recalls the lack of internet infrastructure in Brazil as recently as 2010. As head of the\u00a0National Broadband Plan<\/a>\u00a0under the Ministry of Communications, that\u2019s something he personally addressed. For Anatel today, blocking access to pirate websites and preventing unauthorized devices from communicating online is all in a day\u2019s work.<\/p>\n \u201cThe topic of combating piracy has evolved significantly. We can already see the impact of this work on customer satisfaction indicators for IPTV boxes. Pirate box brands are receiving worse reviews as time goes by,\u201d Coimbra says.<\/p>\n \u201cThis means that the service is getting worse, users are becoming more dissatisfied, and as a result, one day they will no longer use that pirated service. This is a great indicator of the work that Anatel has been doing.\u201d<\/p>\n While blocking a few sites, services, or devices can be managed manually, Coimbra says that automation is the preferred option.<\/p>\n \u201cToday, orders to block pirate boxes are issued manually. We work on call and send the orders to the operators. The operators receive this and implement the IP blocking,\u201d he explains.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat we are going to do at this point is that these orders will no longer be manual, they will have a common system in which everyone [operators and providers] will have access to the system at the same time.\u201d<\/p>\n While it can be argued that manual systems are prone to errors, automated systems are designed to need much less oversight. Whether that means fewer checks and balances remains to be seen. In general, however, limited oversight is considered a plus in the world of site-blocking.<\/p>\n After many years of putting Brazil under enormous pressure to block pirate sites, the current system involving the courts now blocks thousands of them. Yet in a typical display of incremental demands for improvement, rightsholders now want more.<\/p>\n In a January report to the USTR\u00a0(pdf<\/a>)<\/em>, major rightsholders urged ANATEL to \u201cimplement an effective system to tackle online piracy within Internet applications and sites based on Bill of Law #3696\/2023, which was signed by the President on January 15, 2024, and sets forth an administrative site-blocking provision.\u201d<\/p>\n When a country\u2019s ISPs receive their first request to block a single pirate site, using\u00a0carefully targeted, strictly limited measures under the supervision of the courts<\/em>, administrative blocking of tens of thousands of sites is the long-term goal.<\/p>\n This often means blocking measures discussed behind closed doors between mostly commercial entities, with limited or even no oversight from local courts. This is the system preferred by major rightsholders but having inspired Brazil to do more, why should it stop there?<\/p>\n In broad terms, the \u2018internet backbone\u2019 is the core infrastructure that combines to form the foundations of the global internet. It is comprised of the fastest, most capable networks, and data travels via high capacity fiber-optics and advanced \u2018core\u2019 routers. Operated by commercial companies, government, military and educational institutions, effective backbone networks are critical to the functioning of the wider internet.<\/p>\n Considering the\u00a0ongoing crisis<\/a>\u00a0in Italy where the Piracy Shield system has already caused considerable damage with nothing like the same level of access, the idea of messing with the backbone of the internet seems like a bad dream; now it\u2019s wake-up time.<\/p>\n \u201cThe second step, which we still need to evaluate because some companies want it, and others are more hesitant, is to allow Anatel to have access to the core routers to place a direct order on the router,\u201d Coimbra reveals, referencing IPTV blocking.<\/p>\n \u201cIn these cases, these companies do not need to have someone on call to receive the [blocking] order and then implement it.\u201d<\/p>\n Thanks to the interviewer at Tele.Sintese pressing Coimbra after his initial response, what initially sounds like a plan for the future is suddenly revealed as already underway. Will Anatel really access core routers to block IP addresses used for piracy?<\/p>\n \u201cCompanies that deem it convenient can give us limited access, not full access, so that we can perform these blocks directly for non-certified and non-approved equipment. Limited access so that we can only perform these blocks remotely. It would be a kind of virtual seal,\u201d Coimbra adds.<\/p>\n Recall, all devices (mostly Android devices) are illegal without certification, regardless of whether they\u2019re configured for piracy or not. So how long before something like this is actually implemented?<\/p>\n \u201cParticipation is voluntary. We are still testing with some companies. So, it will take some time until it actually happens,\u201d Coimbra says. \u201cI can\u2019t say [how long]. Our inspection team is carrying out tests with some operators, I can\u2019t say which ones.\u201d<\/p>\n Most likely quite surprised at the revelation, the interviewer inquires whether this is also happening in other countries.<\/p>\n \u201cI don\u2019t know. Maybe in Spain and Portugal, which are more advanced countries in this fight. But I don\u2019t have that information,\u201d Coimbra responds, randomly naming two countries with which Brazil has consulted extensively on blocking matters.<\/p>\n \u201cIt\u2019s critical infrastructure, so it has to be done with great care, with a limited scope. That\u2019s why it has to have the support of the company that feels comfortable,\u201d he concludes.<\/p>\n Blocking with great care and with limited scope are the same arguments presented in London during 2010\/11. Due to a lack of transparency, how many domains and IP addresses are currently blocked around the world is impossible to say. That means that it\u2019s impossible to say whether it\u2019s carried out with great care or not.<\/p>\n As for limited scope, Brazil doesn\u2019t appear to be targeting\u00a0all<\/em>\u00a0core routers at the moment. Spain and Portugal, of which nothing is known, may or may not have tested anything at all. By definition, then, the scope is indeed limited and arguing otherwise risks being portrayed as an alarmist who lacks respect for the creative industries.<\/p>\n Source: \u00a0Automated Site-Blocking Incoming<\/h2>\n
Oversight Makes Blocking Less Efficient<\/h2>\n
Targeting the Internet\u2019s Backbone<\/h2>\n
Already Targeting the Internet\u2019s Backbone<\/h2>\n
Limited to Brazil? Or Not\u2026<\/h2>\n
![\"TorrentFreak\"](\"http:\/\/worldjusticenews.com\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/11\/torrentfreak.png\")
<\/a> TorrentFreak.com<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"